Operational Incidents 2002-2007
Henkel openly reports operational incidents when the consequences include at least one of the following:
- Endangerment of the neighborhood or the environment,
- Tangible losses of more than 50,000 euros,
- A high level of public reaction.
The measures taken in response are also described.
Nemours, France, Nov. 12, 2006
| Operational Incident | Measures Initiated |
| At the Nemours site, fabric softener escaped into the retention basin of the outdoor fabric softener tank, and was then swept into a nearby stream along with rainwater. This caused an increase in the level of organic substances in the stream. | To check the rainwater before it is discharged into the stream, an automatic monitoring system was installed. Moreover, the retention tank is being subjected to regular visual checks. |
Hemel Hempstead, Great Britain, Dec. 11, 2005
| Accident/operational incident | Measures initiated |
| Fortunately, the major fire at the Buncefield oil depot near Hemel Hempstead caused only material damage at the Henkel site 400 meters away. | During the almost week-long evacuation of the site and the subsequent repair work, important functions and some of the employees were relocated to other Henkel sites in the vicinity. |
Toluca, Mexico, Sept. 7, 2004
| Accident/operational incident | Measures initiated |
| A fire in the storage area of the detergent production facility damaged the fiberglass façade of the building. Site employees were able to quickly extinguish the fire. | Rapid intervention by the employees kept the damage from extending beyond the storage area and façade. The fiberglass used for the façade was replaced by a fire retardant material. |
Düsseldorf, Germany, Jan. 14, 2003
| Accident/operational incident | Measures initiated |
| A heating chamber exploded in an adhesives plant. In the chamber were two vessels containing epoxy resin, which was being brought to the correct temperature for further processing. Shortly afterwards, released vapors exploded. The epoxy resin had unexpectedly started to polymerize at a temperature far below that specified by the manufacturer. The heat generated accelerated the reaction and caused the explosion, which resulted in damage to property. | The temperature in the heating chamber was reduced at all relevant sites. The manufacturer specifications were double-checked by testing the thermal stability of the epoxy resins. In addition, processes were modified and alternative substances were used. Furthermore, all relevant heating chambers were fitted with additional safety features such as smoke detectors and temperature sensors. |
Bay Point, California, USA June 24, 2003
| Accident/operational incident | Measures initiated |
| A small container holding highly reactive epoxy resin waste overheated in an open water tank in the site’s hazardous waste containment area. The resulting smoke plume and odors alarmed neighbors, who called the fire department and the Public Health Department. The incident resulted from a failure to follow the established cooling procedures. Neither the immediate neighborhood nor the environment were at risk. | To prevent similar incidents in the future, the site has modified its cooling procedures for epoxy resins and is building a closed containment facility with a scrubber. |
Malgrat, Spain, Sept. 6, 2003
| Accident/operational incident | Measures initiated |
| A water-cooled compressor caught fire and burned out completely. Site employees quickly succeeded in extinguishing the fire. The rapid intervention by the employees kept the damage from extending beyond the compressor room. | An air-cooled compressor will prevent risks from arising in the future as a result of any interruption of the cooling water circuit. |
Great Britain, May 14, 2002
| Accident/operational incident | Measures initiated |
| While loading a road tanker at the Belvedere site in Great Britain, two tons of a liquid product containing 34% sodium nitrate, used for surface treatment, were released to an uncontained area of land and via the factories drainage system into a dyke. The incident happened on May 14, 2002 due to incorrect handling of a valve by a Henkel employee. No one was hurt and no serious damage to the vegetation in or around the dyke occurred. However the chemical could have had a more serious impact if it had been released into a sensitive environment. | As a consequence of the release, all related operating procedures were revised and within two months of the incident a total containment structure was built in the tanker loading area to ensure that similar incidents will be prevented in the future. The effectiveness of the additional control measures will be reviewed by corporate auditors. Learnings drawn from the incident have been communicated throughout the Henkel Group to sensitize all sites for necessary preventive action. |
Belgium, Sept. 26, 2002
| Accident/operational incident | Measures initiated |
| On September 26, 2002, in a warehouse of a contractor in Haasrode, a computer-controlled forklift truck ran out of control and crashed into a high bay. The high bay toppled, carrying other bays down with it. Five hundred pallets of Henkel surface-treatment products crashed to the floor, and some of the products started to leak. The local fire department evacuated the buildings of neighboring companies as a precaution before it was clear that there was no danger to people or the environment. | After conferring with the local fire department, the Henkel Düsseldorf site fire department carried out the clean-up operations and transported the products to Germany for safe disposal and recycling.As the damage limitation support provided by the contractor did not measure up to Henkel standards, Henkel terminated its working relationship with this warehousing company. |
